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One of the most pressing issues in quantum key distribution (QKD) is the problem of detector side-
channel attacks. To overcome this problem, researchers proposed an elegant “time-reversal” QKD
protocol called measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), which is based on time-reversed
entanglement swapping. However, MDI-QKD is more challenging to implement than standard point-
to-point QKD. Recently, an intermediary QKD protocol called detector-device-independent QKD
(DDI-QKD) has been proposed to overcome the drawbacks of MDI-QKD, with the hope that it
would eventually lead to a more efficient detector side-channel-free QKD system. Here, we analyze
the security of DDI-QKD and elucidate its security assumptions. We find that DDI-QKD is not
equivalent to MDI-QKD, but its security can be demonstrated with reasonable assumptions. On
the more practical side, we consider the feasibility of DDI-QKD and present a fast experimental
demonstration (clocked at 625 MHz), capable of secret key exchange up to more than 90 km.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure communication is a cornerstone of our society
and finding a way to protect our personal data while
making it globally accessible is a profound challenge.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables the secure es-
tablishment of cryptographic keys between two remote
users, Alice and Bob [1]. Importantly, the security of
QKD depends only on the principles of quantum physics
and can be proven to be secure against quantum eaves-
droppers under certain assumptions about the involved
devices [2–4]. However, in practice, actual devices may
deviate from their ideal specifications and lead to secu-
rity loopholes [5].
In the last decade, much attention has been devoted to
understanding the impact on QKD security due to the be-
haviour of single-photon detectors and how one can break
the security of QKD by exploiting the physics of their op-
eration. It turns out that there are several ways to exploit
the imperfections of the detectors [6–8]. These findings
exemplify the fact that, like all crypto-systems, QKD is
only as strong as its weakest link, despite the fact that
QKD is in principle secure against general attacks. To
overcome this security loophole, researchers proposed
an elegant “time-reversal” protocol called measurement-
device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), which is based
on the principle of entanglement swapping [9–14]. More
specifically, the central idea is to perform a Bell state
measurement (BSM) between two qubit states, which are
randomly prepared by Alice and Bob, as in the standard
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD protocol [1]. In this
case, the measurement unit is seen as part of the un-
trusted quantum channel and security is automatically
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guaranteed against all detector side-channel attacks.
MDI-QKD is however more challenging to implement
than standard point-to-point (PtP) QKD. First, it re-
quires the interference of two independent and indis-
tinguishable photons over long distances. This could
be challenging because the photons have to simultane-
ously arrive at the BSM while maintaining their indis-
tinguishability in all degrees-of-freedom (DoFs). Sec-
ond, the secret key rate (SKR) is limited by the achiev-
able coincidence rate at the BSM, which is at most
50% of the photon detection rate assuming linear op-
tics. Third, the finite-key analysis of MDI-QKD is less
efficient than standard PtP QKD in that it requires a
much larger post-processing block size [15] than its PtP
counterpart [16]. Nevertheless, we note that an exchange
of around 5 kbps over 100 km has been recently demon-
strated (neglecting the finite-key effects) [12].
Recently, a family of QKD protocols was proposed
to simplify MDI-QKD, which we collectively refer to as
detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-QKD) [17–19].
These QKD protocols use the fact that one can encode
multiple qubits (using different DoFs) onto a single pho-
ton and that these qubits can be manipulated indepen-
dently. In this way, one can imagine MDI-QKD being
carried out using only one photon as a carrier for Al-
ice and Bob’s qubits: Alice first encodes her qubit into
the photon and then sends it to Bob, who encodes his
qubit onto another DoF. The resulting two-qubit photon
is then sent to a BSM apparatus. Therefore, only a sin-
gle photon detection is required (like in PtP QKD). Since
the guiding principles of DDI-QKD are similar to those
of MDI-QKD, it is conjectured that the security level of
DDI-QKD is comparable to MDI-QKD. Here, we present
a thorough security analysis of DDI-QKD together with a
new experimental implementation of a complete crypto-
system.
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Fig. 1. Conceptual setup. The schematic (b) corresponds to an alternative version of schematic (a), which is easier to implement.
PC: polarization controller; PBS: polarizing beam splitter; HWP: half-wave plate; BSM: Bell state measurement; FR: Faraday
rotator.
II. PRINCIPLES OF DDI-QKD
The conceptual setup is presented in Fig. 1 (a). Al-
ice encodes a qubit |ψA〉 = αA|H˜〉 + βA|V˜ 〉 in the po-
larization DoF of a single-photon and sends it to Bob.
At the input of Bob a polarizing beam splitter (PBS)
converts the polarization modes into spatial modes such
that the qubit of Alice is converted to a state of the form
|ψA〉 = αA|r〉+ βA|t〉, where r and t represent the trans-
mitted and reflected path of the PBS, respectively. Then,
Bob encodes a qubit |ψB〉 = αB|H〉+βB|V 〉 in the polar-
ization DoF of the photon. The same polarization state
needs to be encoded in the two paths. The state of the
photon is then |ψA〉 ⊗ |ψB〉.
A BSM is performed by recombining the two spatial
modes via a PBS and applying a projection in the ba-
sis {|+〉; |−〉} on both output arms using two additional
PBSs. |+〉 and |−〉 correspond to (|H〉 + |V 〉)/√2 and
(|H〉 − |V 〉)/√2, respectively. A click in one of the four
outputs corresponds to a projection into one of the fol-
lowing Bell states:{
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
[|r〉|H〉 ± |t〉|V 〉]
|Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
[|r〉|V 〉 ± |t〉|H〉] . (1)
In order to exchange secret keys, the protocol is the
following: Alice and Bob independently encode states
randomly chosen out of the four following BB84 states
(|H〉; |V 〉; |+〉; |−〉). The probabilities for each Bell state
are given in Tab. I. After sifting, one cannot determine
the bit sent by Alice only from the knowledge of which
detector has clicked. Both the result of the BSM and
the state encoded by Bob are necessary to retrieve the
bit chosen by Alice, using Tab. II. Before describing the
practical implementation, we will take a closer look at
the security.
III. SECURITY OF DDI-QKD
The security of DDI-QKD is based on the following
assumptions: i) Alice and Bob’s random number gener-
ators as well as the classical post-processing are trusted.
a) |Φ+〉
H V + −
H 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.25
V 0.00 0.50 0.25 0.25
+ 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.00
− 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.50
b) |Φ−〉
H V + −
H 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.25
V 0.00 0.50 0.25 0.25
+ 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.50
− 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.00
c) |Ψ+〉
H V + −
H 0.00 0.50 0.25 0.25
V 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.25
+ 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.00
− 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.50
d) |Ψ−〉
H V + −
H 0.00 0.50 0.25 0.25
V 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.25
+ 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.50
− 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.00
Tab. I. Bell state probabilities of the DDI-QKD protocol.
Probabilities to measure the photon in each Bell state as
a function of the qubits encoded by Alice (rows) and Bob
(columns).
Bob |Φ+〉 |Φ−〉 |Ψ+〉 |Ψ−〉
H 0 0 1 1
V 1 1 0 0
+ 0 1 0 1
− 1 0 1 0
Tab. II. Truth table used by Bob to extract the bit values.
For Alice, the bit values are 0 and 1 for the states {H ; +} and
{V ;−}, respectively. Note that the bit values of Bob depend
on the qubit state and on the BSM result.
This basic assumption is necessary for all QKD schemes,
including device-independent (DI-QKD) protocols. ii)
Alice and Bob’s linear optical circuits are fully charac-
terized and cannot be influenced by any eavesdropper,
commonly denoted as Eve. iii) Eve may exploit imper-
fect detectors via the optical fiber, but she has no physical
access to the detectors, in particular she has no access to
the outputs of the interferometer. iv) The detectors may
have some defects, but are not from a malicious provider.
This means they are independent of Eve.
In the case of single-qubit quantum channels (i.e. Eve
is restricted to sending pulses of light to Bob, which are
on the single photon level) the first two assumptions are
sufficient in order to prove formally the security of DDI-
QKD. This has been shown in Refs. [17, 18
3tailed in the Appendix A. This also means that for this
scenario DDI-QKD and MDI-QKD are equivalent.
The situation is more complicated if we consider at-
tacks based on multi-photon states. With strong pulses,
Eve could easily make a Trojan horse attack and measure
Bob’s settings if she had access to the output of Bob’s
interferometer. But this is in contradiction with assump-
tion iii). Eve could also try a more subtle Trojan horse
attack as proposed in Ref. [20], where the detectors have
shared randomness with Eve, which is in contradiction
with assumption iv). Another attack could be the siphon-
ing attack presented in Appendix B, which works even
if the quantum channel is restricted to a single spatial-
temporal mode. However, this attack is not compatible
with assumptions iii) and iv). Finally, it is important to
note that Trojan horse attacks based on back reflection,
which can affect both Alice and Bob, have to be avoided
by using a set of isolators and frequency filters as is the
case for MDI-QKD as well.
Let us now consider the class of attacks based on de-
tector blinding [7]. To perform such attacks, the eaves-
dropper shines strong classical light onto the detectors,
such that they all cease to work in the Geiger mode and
instead begin to operate in the linear regime. In this
regime, if any of the detectors receive a light pulse which
exceeds a certain threshold, a detection signal can be
generated. From the perspective of Bob, this signal is
indistinguishable from that generated by a single-photon
detection in the Geiger mode. Let us denote by µi the
threshold of the detector Di. If only one detector (one
Bell state) was used, the system is equivalent to a normal
BB84 protocol and is potentially vulnerable as shown in
Ref. [7]. However, if we consider the DDI-QKD setup
with a complete BSM, such an attack will be detected by
looking at the detection statistics. In the case where
the thresholds of the four detectors are identical, the
blinding attack will generate double detections. When
this happens, Bob assigns a detection to a random de-
tector, which affects directly the quantum bit error rate
(QBER). In the case where the thresholds are different
for every detector, for example if µ1 < µ2, then it is
indeed possible to generate a detection in D1 while D2
does not click. However, Eve will not be able to make D2
click independently. More generally, with such an attack,
she will not be able to reproduce the expected detection
probabilities for all detectors and all settings of Alice and
Bob, as detailed in Tab. I. Note that, active randomiza-
tion of the detection statistics has been proposed as a
countermeasure against blinding attacks [21, 22].
In short, despite their conceptual similarities, DDI-
QKD is not equivalent to MDI-QKD and the additional,
arguably very reasonable, assumptions iii) and iv) have
to be made in order to guarantee its security.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In our previous proof-of-principle experiment [17], Al-
ice and Bob used the polarization and spatial DoFs, re-
spectively, to encode their qubits. It is challenging to
achieve high encoding rates with such an implementation,
because Bob’s phase modulator has to be polarization in-
sensitive, something that is not possible with high-speed
electro-optic modulators. To overcome this, we use the
polarization DoF at Bob and simplify the experimental
setup by substituting the Mach-Zehnder configuration
(Fig. 1 (a)) with a Sagnac interferometer (Fig. 1 (b)).
In this way, no active phase stabilization is needed to
preserve the state encoded by Alice. Moreover, only one
polarization modulator, supplemented with a Faraday ro-
tator and a half-wave plate (HWP), is necessary to en-
code the same state of polarization in both directions,
i.e. clockwise and counter-clockwise.
Our practical implementation is depicted in Fig. 2. Al-
ice’s source starts with a gain-switched DFB laser at
1554.94nm (ITU channel C28) triggered at 625MHz,
which generates light pulses with a duration of 80 ps.
The qubit states are encoded via a set of fiber polariza-
tion controllers (PCs) and a birefringent lithium-niobate
(LiNbO3) phase modulator (PM) driven by a 3-level
pulse generator. Photons enter the PM in the state
(|H〉 + |V 〉)/√2 and the effect of the PM is to trans-
form the state into (|H〉 + eiφ|V 〉)/√2, where φ is the
encoded phase. To compensate the temporal walk-off
(around 10 ps) introduced by the birefringence of the
modulator, 8 m of polarization-maintaining fiber (PMF)
(high-birefringence fiber) is added. The temperature of
the birefringent elements (PM and PMF) is actively sta-
bilized to avoid polarization drifts. An additional unitary
transformation is performed via a PC placed at the out-
put of the PMF to generate the qubits in the Z or X
basis.
On Bob’s side, the polarization qubits of Alice are con-
verted into spatial qubits by a free-space four-port PBS
with a polarization rejection superior than 1/1000 for the
four arms. As represented in Fig. 2, at the outputs of the
PBS, a Sagnac loop consists of a Faraday rotator, a PM
and a PMF, identical to those of Alice. These elements
transform both components of Alice’s qubit - those that
rotate clockwise and counter-clockwise in the Sagnac loop
- such that they pass through the PM with the same state
of polarization and at the same time. Alice’s encoding in
polarization has therefore been completely transformed
into a spatial encoding. Whilst Bob’s qubit is encoded
by the PM in the same way that Alice had encoded her
own.
To perform the BSM, a PC and a PBS is placed in each
output port of the loop. The outputs of the BSM cor-
responding to |Ψ+〉 and |Ψ−〉 are delayed by 800 ps and
combined with |Φ+〉 and |Φ−〉, respectively, by means of
PBSs. This allows the use of just two detectors for all
four Bell states. Bob’s setup has 7.1 dB of attenuation
mainly due to the PM (≈ 4 dB). The photons are detected
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Fig. 2. Schematic of the fast DDI-QKD system. PC: polarization controller; PM: phase modulator based on a lithium niobate
waveguide; PMF: polarization maintaining fiber; Cir: optical circulator; PBS: polarizing beam splitter; FR: Faraday rotator.
by two InGaAs/InP negative feedback avalanche diodes
operating in the free-running mode and cooled with a
free-piston Stirling cooler [23]. The laser, the PMs and
the detectors are connected to two field-programmable
gate arrays (FPGAs) placed on Alice and Bob’s side. A
service channel operating on a separate optical fiber is
used to synchronize the two parties and to exchange data
during the key sifting phase [24, 25].
For the key exchange protocol, we use the Z basis to
generate the data and the X basis to estimate the phase
error rate. To maximize the key rate, the probability of
choosing the Z basis is 87.5%, both on Alice and Bob’s
side. To simplify the experimental implementation, Alice
uses only three states (|H〉; |V 〉; |+〉) [26, 27], while Bob
uses four states as usual. For a standard BB84 protocol
with four states, the QBER in the X basis is approxi-
mated by
pX,err ≈ N+− +N−+
N++ +N−− +N+− +N−+
, (2)
with Na,b the number of detections where Alice prepares
the state a and Bob’s measurement outcome is b. For a
three state protocol, the phase error rate can be formu-
lated in terms of matched and mismatched bases statis-
tics. In particular, we have:
pX,err ≈ N+−
N++ +N+−
+
1
2
(
NH+
NH+ +NH−
+
NV+
NV+ +NV−
− 1
)
. (3)
The SKR is calculated from the error rates in the Z
and X bases for different transmissions as a function of
µ, the mean number of photons per pulse sent by Alice.
We make no assumption about the detection efficiency of
the detectors as well as the transmission of Bob’s setup.
The upper bound on the extractable secret key length is
given by:
ℓ =
⌊
slb
Z,1(1− h2(δubZ,ph))− leakEC
− 4 log2 (7/εsec)− log2 (1/εcor)
⌋
, (4)
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Fig. 3. (a) SKR as a function of the distance. The red squares
correspond to complete distillation of a secret key. The black
curve corresponds to the SKRs measured without taking into
account the finite key statistics. (b) QBER in the Z and X
bases as a function of the distance.
where slb
Z,1 is the lower bound on the number of single-
photon detections in the Z basis, δub
Z,ph is the upper
bound on the phase error rate, leakEC is the number
of bits revealed during the error correction step, and
εsec and εcor are the secrecy and correctness parame-
ters, respectively. We fixed the security parameter to
εqkd = εcor + εsec = 4 × 10−9, which is similar to those
typically used in PtP QKD systems [25]. Please refer to
Appendix A for more details about equations 3 and 4 as
well as their derivation.
V. KEY DISTILLATION
We performed an exchange of secret keys with com-
plete distillation - i.e. including finite key analysis and
privacy amplification - at three different distances sim-
5Attenuation [dB] SKR [kbps]
0.28 9.7
2.8 5.3
6.8 1.8
Tab. III. SKR obtained at the output of the system after
distillation of block size of 107 bits for different attenuations.
ulated with a variable attenuator. For every result de-
picted in Tab. III we optimized the following parameters
in order to maximize the SKR: µ, the number of photons
per pulse sent by Alice; the dead time of the detectors and
the temperature of the detectors. The error correction
was carried out using an optimized Cascade algorithm,
implemented in C++, which achieved an efficiency of rec-
onciliation of 1.04 for a QBER of 3% [28]. The efficiency
of reconciliation fEC is defined as fEC = m/(nH(A|B)),
with m the number of bits disclosed during the error cor-
rection, n the length of the key before error correction
and H(A|B) the conditional entropy between the keys
of Alice and Bob before the error correction. In order
to reduce the effect of finite-key statistics, the privacy
amplification was carried out on a block size of 107 bits.
We obtained a SKR of 1.8 kbps for an attenuation of
6.8 dB corresponding to a distance of 34 km considering
0.2 dB/km loss.
We also performed exchange of secret keys for addi-
tional distances without taking into account the finite
key analysis. The corresponding SKRs as a function of
the attenuation (converted into fiber distance consider-
ing loss of 0.2 dB/km) between Alice and Bob are plotted
in Fig. 3 (a). We obtained an SKR of 8.2 bps at 91 km.
Let us emphasize that these data are obtained from the
statistics of actual raw keys. Moreover, the correspond-
ing error rates in the Z and X bases are given in Fig. 3
(b). The difference between ex and ez is mainly due to
the polarization depend loss of the Sagnac loop elements
which introduces a small bias between H and V.
In comparison to a standard BB84 implementation,
our system is affected by the significant loss in Bob’s
device. It could be possible to reduce this loss by at
least 2 dB by changing the PM. Nevertheless, we achieved
key exchange over distances up to 91 km without de-
coy states [29–31], which would not be possible for MDI-
QKD. The maximal distance could be significantly im-
proved by adding decoy-state preparation at Alice in or-
der to optimize the bound on the single photon detec-
tions. In this configuration we expect to exchange a se-
cret key at a rate of 2 bps over 250km of standard single
mode fiber. This prediction is based on a simulation
which takes into account loss in the apparatus and error
rates as measured in our experiment, as well as finite key
analysis with a block size of 106 bits.
VI. CONCLUSION
We discussed the security of DDI-QKD, which is not
equivalent to MDI-QKD in the most general scenario.
Nevertheless, we have shown that under very reasonable
assumptions, its security can be guaranteed. Although
the title “detector-device-independent” could be debat-
able, DDI-QKD offers improved security compared to
normal PtP protocols while being easier to implement
than MDI-QKD. In particular DDI-QKD requires only
single-photon interference, the BSM is 100% efficient and
the performance in the finite-key scenario is similar to
PtP QKD.
We implemented a complete high-speed version of the
DDI-QKD protocol clocked at 625 MHz, based on polar-
ization encoded qubits. We distilled secret keys, whilst
accounting for finite-key effects, at a rate of 1.8 kbps for
a distance of 34 km. Furthermore, we achieved a key ex-
change over 91 km (without decoy-state preparation).
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Appendix A: Estimation of the secret key rate
Here, we first present briefly the security analysis of
our QKD protocol against a large class of attacks under
the assumption that the adversary, Eve, can only forward
a qubit or a vacuum state in each use of the quantum
channel. Then we show how to estimate the SKR from
our experimental raw data.
In our QKD implementation, Alice uses a phase-
randomized laser source with intensity µ to prepare her
qubits. In this case, the source generates in each run a
vacuum state with probability exp(−µ), a single-photon
state with probability µ exp(−µ), and a multi-photon
state with probability 1− (1 + µ) exp(−µ). To deal with
events that are not single photons, we conservatively as-
sume that (1) multi-photon states are insecure and (2)
vacuum states are secure qubit states. The former is
due to the fact that Eve can perform photon-number
splitting attacks and the latter is due to the fact that
vacuum states carry zero information about Alice’s bit
values; this also applies to Bob.
Recall that in each run of the implementation, Alice
randomly prepares her qubit in one of the three states
{|0〉, |1〉, |+〉}. This choice of encoding is known as the
three-state QKD protocol [26], and it has been recently
6shown that it is loss-tolerant if mismatched bases statis-
tics are taken into consideration [27]. By loss-tolerant, we
mean that three-state QKD is resilient against attacks
that exploit channel loss and source errors (i.e., encoding
flaws). Interestingly, it has also been shown that the secu-
rity performance of three-state QKD is similar to BB84
QKD. This means that the fourth qubit state, |−〉, is
redundant.
Before we state the security bounds for our protocol,
it is instructive to spell out the security criteria that we
are using. For some small protocol errors, εcor, εsec > 0,
we say that our protocol is εcor + εsec-secure if it is εcor-
correct and εsec-secret. More specifically, let SA and SB
be Alice and Bob’s output keys, then the former is sat-
isfied if Pr[SA 6= SB] ≤ εcor, i.e., the secret keys are
identical except with a small probability εcor. The lat-
ter is satisfied if (1 − pabort)‖ρAE − UA ⊗ ρE‖1/2 ≤ εsec
where ρAE is the classical-quantum state describing the
joint state of SA and E, UA is the uniform mixture of all
possible values of SA, and pabort is the probability that
the protocol aborts. Importantly, this secrecy criterion
guarantees that the protocol is universally composable:
the pair of secret keys can be safely used in any crypto-
graphic task, e.g., for encrypting messages, that requires
a perfectly secure key.
To analyze the security of our QKD implementation,
we work in a counterfactual scenario where Alice and
Bob are using the asymmetric BB84 QKD, i.e., the Z
basis is used for the key and the X basis is used for pa-
rameter estimation. In this scenario, an upper bound on
the extractable secret key length is obtained by using the
bound given in Ref. [16]:
ℓ =
⌊
slbZ,1(1− h2(δubZ,ph))− leakEC
− 4 log2 (7/εsec)− log2 (1/εcor)
⌋
, (A1)
where slb
Z,1 is the lower bound on the number of single-
photon detections in the Z basis, δub
Z,ph is the upper bound
on the phase error rate, leakEC is the number of bits re-
vealed during the error correction step [32], and h2(x) is
the binary entropy function. In the following, we show
how to compute slb
Z,1 and δ
ub
Z,ph using measurement statis-
tics obtained in the actual QKD system. To start with, we
denote by nZ and nX the total number of detections in the
Z and X bases, respectively. Then, we have that the total
number of detections (in either basis) is a sum of detec-
tions conditioned on the number of photons sent by Al-
ice. For example, for the Z basis, we have nZ =
∑
k sZ,k,
where sZ,k is the number of detections conditioned on
Alice sending k-photon states. Note that since all vac-
uum states are assumed to be secure qubit states, we may
absorb sZ,0 into sZ,1.
Let NZ be the number of signals with which Alice
and Bob choose the Z basis, then a simple lower bound
on sZ,1 is obtained by subtracting G(NZ) the number of
multi-photon states sent by Alice from the total number
of detections,
slb
Z,1 = nZ −G(NZ), (A2)
where
G(x) :=
⌊
x(1− (1 + µ)e−µ) +
√
log(ε−1sec)x/2
⌋
. (A3)
Here we used the fact that the photon number distribu-
tion follows a Poisson distribution and that maximally
⌊NZ(1− (1 +µ)e−µ) +
√
log(ε−1sec)NZ/2⌋ of the states are
multi-photon states; although the latter statement only
holds with probability 1 − εsec. Likewise, we have the
same bound for the X basis,
slb
X,1 = nX −G(NX). (A4)
Next, we need to estimate the number of phase errors
in sZ,1. In BB84 QKD, this estimation problem is a clas-
sical random sampling (without replacement) problem,
and one can use the error rate δX in the X basis to esti-
mate the phase error rate δZ,ph in the Z basis. However, in
three-state QKD, one only has partial observation of the
error rate in the X basis, since only the state |+〉 is sent in
the X basis. Recently, it has been shown that the phase
error rate can be exactly estimated (in the asymptotic
limit) by using the mismatched bases statistics and the
partial error rate observed in the X basis [27]. Below, for
completeness, we provide an alternative derivation that
relates δX to the above measurement statistics.
Suppose Alice is able to prepare single-photon states
and Eve interacts independently and identically with
each photon; later we will consider the scenario with weak
laser pulses. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we
may assume that the quantum channel has perfect trans-
mission, since Bob’s basis choice is independent of Eve’s
attacks and Alice and Bob postselect the measurement
statistics. In this scenario, we may describe Eve’s actions
using the following transformations:
UAE |H〉A|φ〉E = |H〉A|φ1〉E + |V 〉A|φ2〉EUAE |V 〉A|φ〉E = |H〉A|φ3〉E + |V 〉A|φ4〉E ,
(A5)
where |φi〉 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are Eve’s quantum states (not
necessarily normalized). Furthermore, since UAE is uni-
tary, we have 〈φ1|φ1〉+〈φ2|φ2〉 = 1, 〈φ3|φ3〉+〈φ4|φ4〉 = 1,
and 〈φ1|φ3〉 + 〈φ2|φ4〉 = 0, 〈φ3|φ1〉 + 〈φ4|φ2〉 = 0; since
the context is now clear, hereafter we will omit the sub-
system labels. Using the above transformations, we thus
have
UAE |±〉|φ〉 = |H〉 (|φ1〉 ± |φ3〉) + |V 〉 (|φ2〉 ± |φ4〉)√
2
.
(A6)
Let a ∈ {H,V,+} and b ∈ {H,V,+,−}, then the proba-
bility that Bob detects b (using the Z basis) when Alice
has sent a (in the Z basis) follows
pZZ(H |H) = 〈φ1|φ1〉
pZZ(V |H) = 〈φ2|φ2〉
pZZ(H |V ) = 〈φ3|φ3〉
pZZ(V |V ) = 〈φ4|φ4〉.
(A7)
7From the above, the probabilities for mismatch basis
choices are thus given by
pXZ(±|H) = 12 ± Re[〈φ1|φ2〉]
pXZ(±|V ) = 12 ± Re[〈φ3|φ4〉]
pZX(H |±) = 〈φ1|φ1〉2 + 〈φ3|φ3〉2 ± Re[〈φ1|φ3〉]
pZX(V |±) = 〈φ2|φ2〉2 + 〈φ4|φ4〉2 ± Re[〈φ2|φ4〉].
(A8)
Since pZX(H |±) + pZX(V |±) = 1, we have Re[〈φ1|φ3〉] +
Re[〈φ2|φ4〉] = 0. Accordingly, we have
pXX(+|±) = 1
2
(
1 + Re[〈φ1|φ2〉] + Re[〈φ3|φ4〉]
± Re[〈φ2|φ3〉]± Re[〈φ1|φ4〉]
)
. (A9)
In the counterfactual BB84 QKD, Alice prepares |+〉, |−〉
with uniform probability, and the probability of error
in the X basis is defined as pX,err := pXX(+|−)/2 +
pXX(−|+)/2. Using the above equations, we get
pX,err =
1
2
[pXZ(+|H) + pXZ(+|V ) + 2pXX(−|+)− 1] .
(A10)
That is, the probability of observing an error in the X
basis statistics can be exactly estimated by three condi-
tional probabilities: pXZ(+|H), pXZ(+|V ), and pXX(−|+).
To estimate the phase error rate δZ,ph in the Z ba-
sis using Eq. (A10), we have to first estimate pXZ(+|H),
pXZ(+|V ), and pXX(−|+) from the observed statistics. To
start with, let m(b, a) denote the number of detections
when Alice sends light pulses prepared in a ∈ {H,V,+}
and Bob encodes b ∈ {H,V,+,−}, and mX(a) =
m(+, a) + m(−, a). Then, following the method as de-
scribed before, we can compute a lower bound on the
number of single-photon detections in mX(a) for any
a. For instance, we have qlb
X,1(a) = mX(a) − G(NX(a)),
where NX(a) is the number of instances with which Alice
sends a and Bob chooses an encoding in the X basis. With
that, we can compute upper bounds on the relative fre-
quencies associated with the above conditional probabil-
ities, i.e., we have
fub(±|a) = min
{
1
2
,
m(±, a)
qlb
X,1(a)
}
, (A11)
for any a. Next, by making use of Hoeffding’s inequality,
we further get
pXZ(+|a) < pubXZ(+|a) := fub(+|a) +K(qlbX,1(a)), (A12)
where K(x) :=
√
2x/log(1/εsec). Putting everything to-
gether, we thus get
pub
X,err =
1
2
[
pub
XZ
(+|H) + pub
XZ
(+|V ) + 2pub
XX
(−|+)− 1] .
(A13)
Finally, to compute δub
Z,ph, we use the Hoeffding’s inequal-
ity again to get
δub
Z,ph := p
ub
X,err +K(s
lb
X,1). (A14)
Appendix B: Siphoning attacks on DDI-QKD
In this section, we present a quantum siphoning attack
on BB84 and DDI-QKD. This attack is more powerful
than the attack proposed in Ref. [20]: it does not require
shared randomness between Bob’s laboratory and Eve
and works even if Bob’s input optical mode is restricted
to a single spatial-temporal mode. The central idea of
the attack is to exploit the fact that multi-photon states
live in the tensor product of single photon subspaces,
and linear optical circuits act on each photon indepen-
dently. Crucially, these observations suggest that Eve
can use multi-photon states to learn about Bob’s qubit
choices, thereby breaking the security of DDI-QKD.
To illustrate the above idea and to understand the se-
curity boundary of DDI-QKD, we start from a conserva-
tive scenario whereby the detectors are black boxes and
adversarial in nature. In particular, we assume that the
untrusted detectors are controlled by an internal adver-
sary called Fred, who can perform any quantum opera-
tion. Furthermore, we assume that Fred and Eve (who is
controlling the quantum channel) are collaborators and
they agree on a set of possible actions beforehand. How-
ever, Fred cannot communicate freely with Eve, since
Bob’s laboratory is secure; however, as we will show be-
low, Eve can communicate freely with Fred. Also, Fred
is restricted to his own device and has no access to Bob’s
linear optical circuit, e.g., Bob’s random basis choices
and bit values.
On Bob’s end, we assume that he is able to restrict
all input light states to a single optical spatial-temporal
mode, where any quantum information is encoded in the
polarization DoF. This assumption is pretty strong as
it already allows Bob to rule out a large class of detec-
tor side-channel attacks, e.g., time-shifting attacks. Nev-
ertheless, despite this assumption, we show below that
DDI-QKD is insecure if the quantum channel admits
multi-photon excitations of the input optical mode.
Trusted linear 
optical circuit Fred BSM outcomes
Bob’s laboratory
Eve’ injection
Fig. 4. With reference to Fig. 1 in the main text, we assume
that all the four output ports of Bob’s linear optical circuit are
given to Fred. In this case, Fred has access to the transformed
multi-photon state and can perform any quantum operation
on it. After the operation, he makes a measurement and out-
puts either one of the four Bell outcomes, {Φ+,Φ−,Ψ+,Ψ−},
or the inconclusive outcome, ∅.
The quantum siphoning attack is carried out in three
phases: (1) the intercept-and-resend phase, (2) the qubit
extraction phase, and (3) the siphoning phase. In the
8first phase, Eve measures Alice’s qubit randomly using
either the Z or X basis, and sends a n-photon state to
Bob, where each photon is prepared in the equal super-
position of the horizontal and vertical polarization states,
i.e., |χi〉Eve = |H〉/
√
2+|V 〉/√2. The number of photons,
n, is dependent on Eve’s basis choice and her measure-
ment outcome: n takes value from the set {nj}4j=1, which
corresponds to {H,V,+,−}. For example, n = n1 means
Eve measures in the Z basis and obtains H and n = n4
means she measures in the X basis and obtains −. Note
that the set {nj}4j=1 satisfies nj 6= nk for all j 6= k and
nj ≫ 3 for all j.
In the second phase, the nj-photon state passes
through Bob’s linear optical circuit and each photon is
transformed to a four-dimensional quantum state (just
before the detectors/Fred):
|χφf 〉Eve =
(1 + eiφ)(|1〉+ |2〉) + (1− eiφ)(|3〉+ |4〉)
2
√
2
,
(B1)
where {|i〉}i is simply the single-photon basis states
for the four output ports of Bob’s linear optical cir-
cuit. Recall that Bob’s qubit choice is denoted by φ ∈
{0, π, π/2, 3π/2}. In fact, we can further simplify the
above equation to reflect an effective qubit state by
using the transformations: |0˜〉 = (|1〉 + |2〉)/√2 and
|1˜〉 = (|3〉+ |4〉)/√2, |±˜〉 = (|0˜〉 ± |1˜〉)/√2, giving
|χφf 〉Eve =
(1 + eiφ)
2
|0˜〉+ (1− e
iφ)
2
|1˜〉. (B2)
Indeed, we see that when the input is a single-photon
state, the resulting output states are the BB84 qubit
states (up to local rotations), where one basis is given
by
|χ0f 〉Eve = |0˜〉, |χpif 〉Eve = |1˜〉, (B3)
and the other basis given by
|χpi/2f 〉Eve =
|+˜〉+ i|−˜〉√
2
, |χ3pi/2f 〉Eve =
|+˜〉 − i|−˜〉√
2
.
(B4)
When the input state is a nj-photon state, the output
is nj copies of Bob’s qubit; because Fred has access to
all the four output ports. This means that Fred can first
measure the photon number of the output state and learn
about Eve’s basis choice and her measurement outcome.
Then, Fred can determine φ, i.e., Bob’s qubit choice by
performing the optimal unambiguous state discrimina-
tion (USD) measurement for nj photons. In particular,
the regime in which Fred can unambiguously learn about
φ starts from n = 3, with a success probability of 1/2.
That is, there exists an USD measurement which Fred
can perform to extract φ from 3 copies of |χφf 〉Eve with
probability at least 1/2. In the general case where n ≥ 3,
it can be shown that the probability of success for a nj-
photon injection is lower bounded by the smallest eigen-
value of the following 2× 2 block matrix [33]:
psucc(nj) ≥ λmin
([
I2 C(nj)
C(nj) I2
])
, (B5)
where
I2 :=
[
1 0
0 1
]
, C(nj) :=


(
1√
2
)nj (
1√
2
)nj
(
1√
2
)nj (−1√
2
)nj

 .
Indeed, in the case of nj = 3, we see that psucc(3) ≥ 1/2.
Since Eve can inject an arbitrary number of photons, we
have to assume the limiting case and take psucc(nj) ≈ 1
with nj ≫ 3 for any j.
In the final phase, Fred first compares Eve and Bob’s
basis choices. If they are the same, he simply outputs
a Bell state that is consistent with their bit values and
basis choice, otherwise, he announces the measurement as
inconclusive. In particular, Fred uses Tab. I to determine
the BSM outcome. For example, if Eve’s outcome is V
and Bob’s qubit choice isH , then Fred outputs Ψ+ or Ψ−
with probability 1/2 each. Note that this attack works
whenever the quantum channel loss is ≥ 1/2.
The above quantum siphoning attack works even if Bob
limits the input light state to a single optical spatial-
temporal mode. Our proposed attack is essentially an
entanglement-breaking operation, since it requires Eve
to perform an intercept-and-resend attack. More cru-
cially, it should be noted that this attack works as long
as Eve is able to send multi-photon states to Bob. This
problem is reminiscent of the security problem faced by
the bi-directional “plug & play” QKD system, where
Eve can apply Trojan horse attacks to learn about Al-
ice’s bit values. Such Trojan horse attacks could be miti-
gated by employing countermeasures like those proposed
in Ref. [34]. To conclude, our attack shows that DDI-
QKD is not equivalent to MDI-QKD, despite their con-
ceptual similarities, and additional assumptions are nec-
essary to guarantee the security of DDI-QKD as dis-
cussed in Sec. III.
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